We study whether corruption hinders businesses by investigating China's private enterprises, which have developed rapidly despite high corruption levels. We argue that a key factor determining the effects of corruption is corruption predictability, which is significantly influenced by government leadership stability. When the same leaders remain in major offices for long tenures, corruption is relatively predictable, reducing hindrance to businesses. When leaders change frequently, entrepreneurs need to constantly cultivate new connections with officials and face more uncertainty; therefore, corruption becomes a major obstacle. We conduct field interviews to explore channels through which leadership stability encourages predictable corruption. We also use the 2012 World Bank Enterprise Survey of Chinese private firms and develop a novel measure of leadership stability of the local Chinese government based on a selfcollected data set of municipal party committees to test our hypotheses. Results of various models are consistent with our hypotheses.
Introduction
To what extent does corruption, a manifestation of low government quality, jeopardize business operation? Some scholars argue that corruption discourages private investment by distorting the allocation of entrepreneurial talents and resources (e.g., Mauro 1995; Méon and Sekkat 2005; Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991) ; others suggest that corruption helps entrepreneurs circumvent cumbersome regulations and overcome the high threshold of firm entry (e.g., Dreher and Gassebner 2013; Leff 1964; Méon and Weill 2010; Huntington 1968) . To resolve this theoretical debate, we analyze the conditions under which corruption facilitates or hinders business operations by using the case of China's private enterprises, which have been the major economic engines in many localities in the reform era while often victimized by corruption (Li and Xia 2008) .
We argue that a key factor determining the effects of corruption on private businesses is corruption predictability, specifically certainty in outcomes and procedures of corrupt transactions (Wei 1997) . Moreover, according to theories of the market structure of corruption (Shleifer and Vishny 1993), we contend that corruption predictability greatly depends on government leadership stability. Stable leadership, defined as the same small group of officials remaining in power for long tenures, can establish a predictable corruption regime that reduces corruption's hindrance to private business operations in weakly institutionalized countries. In the case of China, local political power is centralized to a small leader circle, and leadership stability varies considerably across localities. Hence, China constitutes an appropriate case to examine the effect of leadership stability on corruption's hindrance to business operations.
We use a mixed-method approach. First, we conduct field interviews to explore channels through which leadership stability encourages corruption predictability, particularly reinforcing the informal contract between bribers and bribees, easing firms' learning curve of corruption, and deterring harassment by low-level bureaucrats. Second, we draw on the 2012 World Bank Enterprise Survey data of 2700 firms in 25 Chinese prefectures to test the effects of leadership stability on corruption hindrance. We develop a novel measure of leadership stability-the effective number of leaders-based on our self-compiled data set of 25 municipal party committees from 2002 to 2011. We find that an increase in the effective number of leaders is associated with firms' heightened perception of corruption as an obstacle, suggesting that leadership stability reduces corruption's hindrance to business operations. Moreover, we document that effects of stable leadership are more pronounced for firms conducting business in a highly corrupt environment and highly regulated industries. Leadership stability also exerts larger impacts on small and medium firms than on large firms. These nuanced findings indicate that firms vulnerable to political uncertainty likely rely more on leadership stability to secure predicable corruption and facilitate business transactions. Thus, empirical findings are consistent with our overall theoretical predictions. Therefore, our study shows that government may at least maintain relatively stable leadership to promote predictable corruption, which reduces hindrance to businesses in societies with serious corruption. Stable political connections can result in not only monetary benefits for firms (Faccio 2006; Fisman 2001) but also a stronger capacity to weather an unfriendly investment environment and envision the foreseeable future. We also extend previous studies of predictable corruption (e.g., Campos, Lien, and Pradhan 1999; Malesky and Samphantharak 2008) by identifying the institutional conditions and the affiliated causal pathways promoting corruption predictability. These theoretical implications altogether help demonstrate why China's private enterprises have flourished in numerous localities despite rampant corruption (Bo 2014; Wedeman 2012 ).
Organization of Corruption and Leadership Stability: A Theoretical Framework
Corruption, commonly defined as using public power for private gain, is sometimes considered parallel to taxes or fees (Svensson 2005) . However, arbitrariness rather than extra payments makes corruption more predatory than tax (Wei 1997) . Without transparency and enforcement between bribers and bribees, corruption creates more uncertainty for investors (Fisman and Svensson 2007) . Firms paying more bribes may ultimately spend more, rather than less, management time in negotiating regulations with bureaucrats and bear higher, rather than lower, costs of capital (Kaufman and Wei 1999) . In worst case scenarios such as that in Cambodia, when governors change because of elections, pre-existing corruption practices break down, followed by a significant decline in firm investments (Malesky and Samphantharak 2008) . By contrast, predictable corruption may reduce corruption's hindrance to business operation. The high private capital flow found in several East Asian countries, including China, despite their high corruption levels is actually conjectured to result from higher corruption predictability in those countries (Campos et al. 1999) . However, what institutional conditions reduce uncertainty and promote corruption predictability, and the channels through which these conditions work are unclear.
Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1993) argue that the structure of government institutions, strength of government in controlling its bureaucracies, and number of veto powers in the political process of a country are critical determinants of corruption level. A strong state with a centralized bureaucracy can set bribe prices for government provisions (e.g., business licenses) collectively by monopolistic bureaucracies and punish any deviations from agreed-upon corruption patterns. Conversely, corruption levels tend to increase in countries with a weak central government and decentralized administrative systems, because different ministries, public agencies, and local governments at various administrative levels all have incentives to set their own bribes independently to maximize their own income from bribes (Malesky and Samphantharak 2008) . For example, private firms' returns on investment tend to decrease with more regulatory checks (Kaufmann 1996; Olken and Barron 2009 ).
In addition to corruption levels, the industrial organization's perspective of corruption gives insights into corruption predictability. For example, in regimes with a small ruling elite, such as monarchies and the former communist regimes, investors may be less concerned with corruption uncertainty. "It is always clear who needs to be bribed and by how much" (Shleifer and Vishny 1993, 605) . Once a bribe is paid to relevant government bureaucrats, no additional bribes would be demanded. Moreover, the favor, service, or product being sought is guaranteed to be granted (Campos et al. 1999) . For firms in such countries, the bribe schedule is "more or less transparent" with "more or less assurance of results… Bribe payment is like a tax, except that it goes into the bureaucrat's pocket rather than the government treasury" (Wei 1997, 2) . However, in a political system with multiple veto powers, favors are not guaranteed, and the total payment is uncertain.
For example, in India, where bribe taking is conducted in a decentralized way and corruption is less predictable, bribing an individual official in a line of many may not ensure faster file movement (Bardhan 1997 (Bardhan , 1324 .
Nevertheless, even in regimes in which officials monopolize power, government favors obtained through corruption may be terminated when the ruling cliques change and incumbent officials are reshuffled frequently (Campos et al 1999) . For instance, in weakly institutionalized countries, even if elections are held regularly, the cabinet may change often, such as replacing the premier followed by replacing 50% or more of cabinet ministers (Aisen and Veiga 2013 
Power Structure and Leadership Stability in China's Local State
In China, political and economic systems were highly centralized in the pre-reform era.
Although local leaders had considerable authority in their appointed jurisdictions, they had limited control over resources, which were allocated by the central government (Landry 2008) . In the reform era, though the national government retains considerable control over the appointment and promotion of central-and provincial-level officials, much autonomy has been granted to local governments through economic decentralization (Landry 2008; Mertha 2005) . Subnational governments, from provincial to county level, have overarching responsibility for "initiating and coordinating reforms, providing public services, and making and enforcing laws" (Xu 2011 (Xu , 1078 and a primary control of a substantial amount of resources such as land, firms' financial resources, energy, and raw materials (Montinola, Qian, and Weingast, 1995; Xu 2011) . Thus, officials at various administrative levels have many opportunities and incentives to seek rent and solicit bribes as the scope of market reform widened (Gong 1997; Wedeman 2012) . Minxin Pei (2006, 13) even argues that corruption in China has changed from "centralized predation" (i.e., state predation by the ruler) to "decentralized predation" (i.e., predation by agents of the state).
Nevertheless, power within each local government is centralized around the local party committee, comprising a small elite group that generally consists of the local party secretary; the governor; the deputy secretary and deputy governor, who oversee economies; the political-legal committee secretary (law enforcement); the disciplinary committee secretary; the secretarygeneral of the local party committee; and the heads of the organizational (personnel issues), propaganda, and united-front departments (co-opting social elites). As the highest decision-making body at each administrative level, the local party committee collectively determines the major agenda of a city, from economic policies, such as land acquisition and transaction for real estate and urban development, taxation, preferential treatment for firms, and the appointment and promotion of lower-level officials, to environmental protection and informational publicity and censorship. Under the local party committee, the chief and deputy chiefs of different party and government branches, legislative and political consultative bodies, state-owned enterprises, and other public institutions also wield substantial power within each functional unit. Altogether, these key party and state cadres constitute local leadership in China (Sun 2008) . Therefore, the local government structure in China is conducive to predictable corruption because a relatively small number of political leaders is maintained within each subnational governmental jurisdiction. In small cities and county levels and lower, business bidders can fulfill their needs by only sending tributes to the chief executive office (Sun 2006; Zhu and Wu 2014) . In this circumstance, if the major leaders stay in power for long tenures, they can further promote corruption predictability and reduce corruption's hindrance to business operations.
However, leaders' tenures vary case by case. The Chinese Communist Party in the postMao era has restored and developed its cadre management system to ensure massive qualitative elites for the modernization drive and to rationalize the previously often turbulent leadership turnovers (Manion 1985) . One reform was adding term limits and age requirements for retirement (Li 2012) . "According to Article 106 of the state constitution and Article 26 of the party constitution, respectively, the term of office of the local territorial chief executives and party secretaries should all be five years" (Guo 2009, 624) . In practice, the observed term in office is often shorter than five years because local leaders may leave their post prematurely for various reasons, 1 including promotion to higher positions, rotation to other rank-equivalent positions, retirement owing to old age or poor health, and demotion or removal after a corruption scandal (Guo 2009). Transfer, retirement, and prosecution are normally beyond the control of local leaders and exogenous to local firms. Thus, local leadership composition changes occasionally. Whereas the same group of leaders stays in power for a relatively long time in some local governments, other governments may experience more leadership turnover in a short period. Figure 1 illustrates the power structure of local leadership in China. Therefore, leadership stability varies across localities in China, leading to different levels of corruption predictability and ultimately varying degrees of hindrance to private enterprises according to our theoretical prediction.
Figure 1 Inserted Here Why Leadership Stability Is Crucial to China's Private Enterprises
We further explore channels through which leadership stability affects corruption predictability for China's private enterprises. Undeniably, China has heavily promoted private enterprises, particularly since the mid-1990s (Dickson 2008 "either obtain some good or avoid suffering some bad at the hands of corrupt officials" (Wedeman 2012, 6) . Most corruption since the 1990s involves mutually beneficial exchanges between government officials and private businessmen (Manion 2013) . According to our field interviews and publicly accessible news reports, we argue that stable leadership makes corruption predictable and reduces the hindrance to business in three main ways: 1) facilitating a virtual contract that increases firms' assuredness of favorable results, 2) providing a transparent bribe schedule that eases firms' learning curve of corruption, and 3) protecting firms from harassment by low-level bureaucrats.
First, leadership stability can increase firms' assuredness of favorable results. Regular government alternation often causes policy uncertainty and changes in government capacity (Feng 2001 wasting a large amount of resources of a company (Lang 2015) . Similarly, in our interview, a
Singaporean entrepreneur who ran a joint venture with Chinese private firms complained that "sometimes, when a new leader came, we were even asked to pay back the waived taxes in the previous years by the former leader. We had to look for consulting firms to help smooth out relations with the leaders." 2 Other interviewees also mentioned similar problems. By contrast, stable local leadership can facilitate a virtual contract between business owners and the government, freeing private businesses from capricious reactions from new government "partners." Li (2011) observes that the contracting process of bribery between businesses and the government is facilitated in a constructed social setting of commitment and reciprocity, which is gradually built up in private firms' long-term cultivation with stable leadership.
The virtual contract between officials and entrepreneurs is more crucial for corrupt exchanges "having a time lag and geographic separation between the bribe payment to the corrupt official and delivery of the public good to the briber" (Li and Wu 2007, 5-6) . Without enforcement of contracts, bribers and corrupt officials would hesitate to deliver their offer first, potentially leading to failed transactions. With stable leadership, more mutual trust exists between officials and entrepreneurs, promoting cooperation between corrupt officials and bribers.
Second, stable leadership can provide firms with a transparent bribe schedule and costefficient means to achieve the designated goal. In corruption exchanges, firms must develop tactical skills to deal with different government agencies, such as learning who to bribe, how much to pay, when to pay, and what to pay. For example, government-uncovered corruption cases show that corrupt officials exhibit diverse preferences, including money, mistresses, and luxury products.
Establishing corrupt relationships with unfamiliar officials can also be risky "because the first one who is explicit about wanting to make or accept a payoff at the mercy of the others who can threaten to report the illegal act" (Rose-Ackerman 1999, 101). Thus, bribing constitutes a learning curve that costs time, money, and sometimes even legal punishment when not conducted carefully.
The cost tends to be particularly high during initial trials (Ohlsson 1992) . With the same group of leaders in power, the amount of bribes and the norms of corruption are stable and well known by the bribers and bribees (Malesky and Samphantharak 2008) . With more experience, firms' cost to execute corruption substantially decreases.
Chinese private enterprises reportedly spend 5%-30% more time than do nonprivate enterprises in cultivating relationships with government officials to obtain what they are entitled to and to secure preferential treatment (Lang 2015). In addition, private firms spend a huge amount of money on officials. A private entrepreneur who nearly went bankrupt complained that to entertain local officials in 2008, he spent 300,000 yuan, which was 20% of firm profits of that year.
This entrepreneur also said that the private firms that could survive and thrive are those investing tremendous amount of public relationship building fees on officials annually, such as Baidu, or those with government connections, such as Huawei. 3 Thus, the same officials staying in power may save entrepreneurs time and money that would otherwise be utilized to build and maintain new connections. In a field interview in a county-level city in Shandong province, a private entrepreneur who owned a construction company said that "We (private entrepreneurs) especially like the situation when the same leader stays in the key office, such as a local party secretary, for a long tenure. If he can concurrently hold multiple positions, it would be even better. This is because making friends with this one person and maintaining friendship only with him can help me get many things done." 4 A manager of a large fishery company in Hainan province told us that though the company deals with several local government offices, it mainly maintains relationships with officials by "visiting them" during major holidays. Because of considerable familiarity with those officials, corruption is not perceived as a major obstacle of the company's business operation.
However, with leadership turnover and new leaders in power, the company usually has to spend at least three to six months to establish relationships with officials.
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Finally, stable leadership can transmit predictable corruption from officials at higher levels to those at the grassroots levels, making the entire corruption regime predictable. Many firms actually more frequently interact with low-level bureaucrats than local high-level officials. Stable government leadership, compared with frequently changing leadership, is more likely to retain the existing government rank and file, which eases firms' interaction with low-level bureaucrats. In particular, stable connections with local leaders protect firms from harassment by street-level bureaucrats. For example, several interviewees described similar stories about how they dealt with extortion by taxmen or various safety inspectors, which is a common problem faced by Chinese private enterprises. Entrepreneurs normally use expensive drinks and food or small gifts to resolve such problems. However, when "inspections" are conducted more frequently, well-connected private entrepreneurs would reveal their friendship with local leaders to deter disturbances. 6 Generally, corrupt relationships may be easier to maintain within the same small group, because honesty, reliability, and trust have been established (Rose-Ackerman 1999). When a bribe schedule is predictable and available, firms may "simply build informal charges into their business plans, just as they would with any other additional costs" (Malesky and Samphantharak 2008, 288) .
In this case, corruption's hindrance to business operation is considerably reduced. The following text summarizes our testable hypothesis, and causal pathways are illustrated in Figure 2 :
Hypothesis: More stable leadership, defined as the same small group of officials remaining in key offices for long tenures, makes corruption more predictable for private entrepreneurs than frequent leadership turnover. With stable leadership, corruption's hindrance is consequently reduced for business operation. 
Empirical Strategy and Results
We test our hypothesis by using the World Bank Enterprise Survey in China conducted between December 2011 and February 2013. A total of 2700 privately owned enterprises were successfully interviewed through stratified random sampling. Compared with simple random sampling, stratified random sampling is a more favorable method for obtaining unbiased estimates for different subdivisions of the population with a known level of precision and unbiased estimates for the whole population of privately owned firms (Lohr 1999) . The survey used three stratification levels: industry, establishment size, and region. The universe of industries was stratified into 11 manufacturing industries and seven service industries, as defined in the sampling manual. (4) To measure the independent variable of leadership stability, we compile a data set of the members of each municipal party committee of the 25 cities from 2002 to 2011 by the survey year.
As mentioned, the local party committee usually consists of the nine most powerful political leaders of a city. Every committee member wields substantial power in the city, takes care of several different policy arenas, and has wide connections in different sectors within the jurisdiction.
Therefore, the committee's stability can, to a large extent, determine the general stability of the local cadre corps, the stability of formal policies, and, importantly, the stability of the informal network between firms and government officials.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to utilize data of all municipal committee members; previous studies have usually focused on one or two topmost leaders. We compile the data set by complementarily searching government websites, municipal party newspapers, and speeches recorded in statistical yearbooks of cities and Baidubaike (baike.baidu.com). Most cities experienced at least one or two leadership turnovers over the 10-year study period. During leadership turnovers, new leaders were sometimes assigned to the city or transferred between positions; for example, they were promoted from mayor to party secretary or moved from the political-legal committee to the disciplinary committee. In some cases, the same leader stayed in the same position for many years.
We develop the variable "the effective number of leaders of a party committee" to capture varying degrees of leadership stability. It is reasonable to assume that over a 10-year period, committee members with longer tenures tend to wield more de facto power because of their knowledge about and informal powerbase within the locality. This is also related to the prevalent informal politics of China, wherein party elders' opinions are usually more crucial than those of newcomers (Huang 2000) . Hence, though a party committee often consists of nine members annually, the essentially effective or influential number of committee members may be fewer than nine. Therefore, we adopt the approach used for calculating the effective number of electoral parties within the legislature (Equation 1, Laakso and Taagepera 1979) as follows:
Equation (1) In the original equation, p is the proportion of seats held by a party within a legislature, and n is the number of parties with at least one seat. In our study, we consider each committee member as a party and their number of years served in the committee within the 10 years as their number of seats in the legislature. We calculate the number of effective leaders of a local party committee over a 10-year period. Higher numbers imply more political turnover and less leadership stability, and lower numbers imply that the same group of leaders stayed in the positions for long tenures. Figure 4 shows the generally positive correlation between the number of effective leaders and the average obstacleindex of cities.
Figure 4 Inserted Here
We also use two alternative measures for leadership stability. First, the number of different officials (number of leaders) appearing in the 10-year name list of a party committee: more names imply more leadership turnover and less leadership stability. Second, the sum of the top two longest tenures among all party committee members in a city (max_top2_leader): higher numbers imply that the same group of leaders had longer tenures and more leadership stability.
To consider confounding variables, we control for a rich set of variables at the firm and city levels. At the firm level, we control for the firm's industrial sector, firm size, share of private capital in the firm, and court justice perception. Court justice measures the quality of formal institutions by averaging firms' response to the question, "Is the local court system fair, impartial and uncorrupted?" Answers to this question are scored from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). Thus, a higher score implies more court justice and a more favorable formal institutional environment of a city. At the city level, we control for the urbanization level (urban population/total population), fiscal income as share of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2011, population size in 2011 (logged), GDP per capita in 2011, and economic structure measured by the share of industrial output in total GDP. We also control for the corruption level proxied by administrative expenditure per capita of a city in 2005, 9 assuming that more administrative expenditure indicates a higher government budget for public servants and a higher potential of official corruption (Kung and Chen 2015; Gong and Xiao 2015) . Descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 1 . Because our dependent variable is dichotomous, we use the logit model to test our hypothesis. Our models to be estimated are as follows:
logit (obstacleindex) = α1 Eff_num_leader + β1Xi + β2Wj + ξi Equation (2), where i indexes a city and j indexes a firm. Xi is a vector of city-level economic control variables, including fiscal income as share of GDP, GDP per capita, industry output as share of GDP, urbanization rate, and logged city population and logged municipal administrative expenditure per capita. Wj is a vector of firm-level characteristics, including industry sector, firm size, private capital share, and court justice perception. Table 2 presents the effects of leadership stability measured by the effective number of leaders on obstacleindex. In column 1, a parsimonious model without any control variables shows that higher effective numbers of leaders in the party committee increase corruption's hindrance to firms. Moreover, the average marginal effect suggests that, if leader numbers increase by one between 2002 and 2011, the probability of firms perceiving corruption as an obstacle increases by 2% on average. In our sample of 25 cities, the number of effective leaders ranges from 12.67 to 20.47. Thus, firms in cities with the highest number of effective leaders were 16% more likely to perceive corruption as an obstacle to business operation than firms in cities with the lowest number of effective committee members over 10 years. Because 24.4% of all firms, on average, perceived corruption as obstacle, a difference of 16% and a marginal effect of 2% of the number of leaders can be considered substantial.
Table 1 Inserted Here

Main Results
Column 2 controls for firm size and firm industry dummies to account for divergent firm characteristics. Results remain significant at the 5% level. Column 3 incorporates two firm-level control variables in the model: the share of private capital of the firm and a firm's perception of court justice. Column 4 controls for a battery of city-level variables to account for variation in economic development, economic structure, demographic features, and fiscal resources across cities. The magnitude and significance of the estimated coefficient of effective number of leaders is fairly robust. In addition to the independent variable, private firms' perception of corruption as an obstacle increases with industrialization of the local economy. Consistent with our conjecture, more government administrative expenditure, i.e., higher corruption potential, constitutes a major obstacle to business operation.
Although we have controlled for a set of potential confounding variables, we are aware that our analysis is hardly immune from omitted variable bias. To alleviate this concern, we examine the extent to which omitted variables may affect our findings according to the insight that the bias from observed controls is informative about the bias from unobserved controls (Altonji, Elder, and Taber 2005) . If we consider column 1 as a restricted model and column 4 as the full model, the lower bound of the true coefficient is 0.101. 10 Moreover, the relationship between omitted variables and our dependent variable must be over 13 times stronger to explain away the entire effect we have identified (Bellows and Miguel 2009) 11 . Therefore, our results are unlikely to be vulnerable to omitted variable bias.
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In Table 3 , we use two alternative measures of leadership stability as independent variables.
Columns 1 and 2 report the effects of the number of leaders on obstacleindex. The average marginal effect test in column 2, which incorporates all control variables, shows that if the number of leaders increases by one, the probability of perceiving corruption as a business obstacle increases by approximately 1.7-2.1% on average. Columns 3 and 4 report the effects of the sum of the top two longest tenures among all party committee members. The results indicate that if the top two longest-tenured leaders stay for one more year in the committee, the probability of firms perceiving corruption as an obstacle decreases by 2.7% on average. To summarize, alternative measures of leadership stability yield results similar and consistent to those of our main indicator.
We also use hierarchical models to check the robustness of our findings, because we include variables at the macro city and micro firm levels. The results in Appendix A are consistent with the findings in Tables 2 and 3 . We find that the magnitude of the estimated effect becomes slightly higher in the hierarchical models. We also run logit regressions within the subsample of 
Conditionally Stronger Effect of Leadership Stability
We further test our hypothesis, particularly the intermediating effect of predictable corruption, by exploring the heterogeneous effects of leadership stability on perceived hindrance of corruption. If our hypothesis holds true, one implication is that predictable corruption is crucial for firms plagued by high corruption levels and that they should depend more on political ties to facilitate their business operations. Leadership stability is crucial in these cases. We use a linear model with an interaction term and follow the approach of Brambor et al. (2006) to display the marginal effects of leadership stability corresponding to changes in corruption level. Figure 5 clearly illustrates that with increased corruption levels, the effect of leadership stability on obstacleindex increases. For example, the effect of leadership stability increases more than twofold from 2% to approximately 5% as corruption level increases from five to six, where most observations are distributed.
Figure 5 Inserted Here
The effect of leadership stability may also change with firms' size and industry which dictates their demand for predictable corruption. Table 4 presents results for different subsamples.
Columns 1-3 report the effect in small, medium, and large firms, respectively. The effect of the effective number of leaders is significant in small and medium firms but insignificant in large firms.
A plausible explanation is that smaller firms likely rely more on local political connections and, thus, are more susceptible to local leadership turnover that affects the predictability of local corruption regime. By contrast, large firms are politically influential (Lorentzen, Landry, and Yasuda 2014) . Some of them are even connected to higher political authorities that shield them from being predated by corruption uncertainty caused by local leadership changes (Wang forthcoming). In addition, market entry barriers vary by industry. In industries heavily regulated by the government, firms often rely more on their political connections to obtain entry permissions.
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